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Cadbury and the rise of the supermarket: innovation in marketing 1953-1975 
Abstract 
This paper uses company archival data, supported by evidence from the trade press, to 
examine the development of the manufacturer-retailer relationship in the case of Cadbury and 
the supermarket retailers distributing its products in the period 1953-1975. It reveals the 
influence upon Cadbury’s marketing strategies and practices of the increasing importance of 
supermarket retailing in relation to the confectionery as well as the grocery goods trades. It 
also provides new insight into the significance of these changes for Cadbury’s relationships 
with other manufacturers, and with small-scale retailers typified by confectioners, 
tobacconists and newsagents. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Retail historians have identified self-service grocery retailing and the associated rise of the 
supermarket retail format as major innovations transforming British food retailing during the 
second half of the twentieth century.1 Structural change in the grocery retail industry, 
resulting from the spread of the supermarket and changes in the regulatory environment, 
among other factors, led to a marked transformation of manufacturer-retailer relations. 
This paper argues that the business history literature exploring the first phase of this retail 
transformation, in the period up to about 1975, has yet to adequately evaluate how the 
renegotiated relationships between manufacturers supplying the retail sector and those 
retailers running major supermarket operations led to changes in the marketing strategies and 
3 
 
practices of both. Nor has it fully assessed the consequences of such changes for the retail 
sector more widely. These consequences extended beyond the large-scale retailers that 
predominantly operated the supermarkets, to include the smaller scale retailers, most notably 
in the context of this study small-scale confectioners, tobacconists and newsagents (hereafter 
CTNs). 
The research presented here considers these matters mainly from the perspective of the 
confectionery and grocery goods manufacturer Cadbury. The broad aim of this paper, 
therefore, is to explore how the marketing strategies and practices of Cadbury were reshaped 
in the context of the rising influence of large-scale retailers operating chains of supermarkets, 
and the implications of this reshaping for retailers more widely. The focus on the firm’s 
marketing strategies subsumes aspects of advertising, pricing and promotion, and display.  
Management historians have claimed that ‘there has been no serious analysis in Britain … of 
the growth of the marketing function in organizations, or indeed of corporate marketing 
strategies, in the second half of the twentieth-century’.2 More specifically, it is argued that 
research linking developments in corporate marketing with broader trends in industrial 
structure is rare in the business history literature.3 In focussing upon the marketing strategy 
and practices of Cadbury in relation to the changing nature of manufacturer-retailer 
relationships more widely we seek to contribute to these surprisingly neglected areas of 
debate.4 In doing so we seek to further understand the paths leading to what, it has been 
argued, marks the beginning of a ‘golden age’ of British retailing in the period subsequent to 
1975.5 More specifically, we add an historical dimension to the business and retail 
management literature that explores the dynamic process through which manufacturer and 
retailer strategies have evolved. 
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2.0 The supermarket and the post war retail environment  
The paper contributes to two main bodies of literature that inform our understanding of the 
emergence and development of supermarket retailing in post war Britain by addressing the 
implications for manufacturers. The first explores the rise of supermarket retail formats, 
typically from the perspective of the retail firm and its activities. The second assesses the 
significance of changes in the regulatory environment, most notably the abolition of resale 
price maintenance (hereafter R.P.M.), for the changing relations between manufacturers and 
retailers, and for developments in the retail sector. 
2.1 Supermarket retail management 
Self-service was the major innovation in post war British retailing. Economies of scale 
achieved by self-service enabled the development of large supermarket formats that were able 
to stock a wide product range under one roof. Rising numbers of supermarkets carried 
implications for manufacturers, as the previous system of supplying numerous smaller stores 
with small quantities of products, either directly or through wholesalers, was replaced with a 
system that required supplying fewer, larger outlets in greater volumes. The number of 
supermarkets grew from approximately 50 in 1950 to 572 by 1961.6 By 1969 there were as 
many as 3400 supermarkets in Great Britain among the estimated 28,000 self-service grocery 
stores.7 Self-service operations (both self-service stores and supermarkets) accounted for 
around 15% of grocery turnover in 1959, rising to as much as 64% only ten years later.8 
Despite Corley’s identification of the growing significance of the supermarket to the 
marketing function of firms such as Huntley & Palmers and Unilever in his early work on 
consumer marketing within business history, matters of marketing management have been the 
focus of considerably less attention in the more recent literature on the history of the 
supermarket.9 Nonetheless, its relevance can be identified from a number of strands within 
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the literature. For example, Alexander revealed the implications for the stocking and 
merchandising of the store of the different patterns of decision-making control at two of the 
leading supermarket chains J. Sainsbury and Tesco.10 Exploring relations further up the 
supply chain, Godley and Williams show how, during the 1950s and 1960s, Sainsbury’s 
sought to manage collaborative relationships with the British poultry industry in order to 
control the standardisation of poultry products that was necessary as the firm transformed its 
retail estate from counter to self-service stores.11 
The instrumental role of branded packaged goods in the development of self-service retailing 
has also been identified.12 Brands mediated shoppers’ engagement with goods,13 and brand 
consciousness and premium pricing cues informed shoppers’ decision-making in the new 
self-service store environments.14 Unsurprisingly, supermarket retailers sought to further 
develop their own brands not only in foods, in which they were in some cases well-
established, but in the increasing array of non-food items that were being stocked in their 
larger stores. Despite such retailer innovations in marketing, manufacturers remained the 
dominant power in the grocery trade and even more so in the confectionery trade where the 
majority of products enjoyed regulatory support under R.P.M.15 
2.2 R.P.M. in confectionery and grocery retailing 
In exploring the developing relationship between supermarket retailers and manufacturers, it 
is important to consider the effect of government regulatory controls. These regulations had 
implications for the marketing activities of manufacturers and retailers. The most significant 
regulation that impacted the marketing strategies of manufacturers and retailers was R.P.M., 
which took two principal forms. Collective R.P.M. (C.R.P.M.) was regulated by the 1956 
Restricted Trade Practices Act, which made it illegal for manufacturers to act in collusion to 
jointly enforce the retail prices at which their products could be sold.16 Individual R.P.M. 
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(I.R.P.M.), between individual manufacturers and retailers, continued under the 1956 
Restricted Trade Practices Act until the 1964 Resale Prices Act was introduced to prohibit 
individual manufacturers from enforcing prices. 
The significance of I.R.P.M. for the manufacturer-retailer relationship varied, depending 
upon the types of goods. Government Board of Trade papers estimated that in 1960 some 
12.5% of all consumer expenditure on food commodities was affected by price maintenance, 
a far lower percentage than in some other commodity groups; for instance, for durable goods 
75% of expenditure was affected.17 There is some debate, therefore, about the importance of 
I.R.P.M. in shaping patterns of grocery retailing. Not all products were subject to I.R.P.M. 
and some manufacturers did nothing to stop price cutting by retailers on price maintained 
goods before 1964, when they had a legal entitlement to do so. Citing this evidence, 
Pickering concluded that I.R.P.M. had effectively ended on most branded groceries by 
1958.18 For confectionery goods, however, the picture was different. During the 1950s and 
1960s, confectionery firms exercised the right to maintain retail prices under I.R.P.M..19 In 
other words, confectionery firms dictated the resale price of their goods to retailers. The 
Board of Trade estimated that some 80% of consumer expenditure on confectionery was 
affected by price maintenance in 1960.20 With the advent of the 1964 Resale Prices Act, this 
situation was about to change. Manufacturers seeking continued exemption were required to 
present their case to the Restrictive Practices Court. As we discuss below, this was a route 
that Cadbury and some other confectionery manufacturers embarked upon, although it was 
ultimately to prove unsuccessful. 
The effect of I.R.P.M. abolition on the manufacturer-retailer relationship was a source of 
contemporary debate in post-war Britain and continues to raise questions for historians.21 
Mercer argues that as a consequence of the 1964 Resale Prices Act the system in which 
manufacturers had influence over retailers’ margins and prices unravelled, such that ‘in place 
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of retailing as a manufacturer’s marketing strategy, conditions of supply were determined by 
the business strategies of multiple retailers’.22 Morelli acknowledges that R.P.M. had 
‘restricted the ability of large retail organisations to capitalise on cost advantages by lowering 
prices to the consumer to increase their market’.23 He argues, however, that the collapse of 
R.P.M. is insufficient to explain the subsequent concentration of supermarket retailer power 
from the 1990s onwards. 
The work of Mercer and Morelli helps us to understand the implications of I.R.P.M. abolition 
for the changing balance of power between manufacturers and retailers at an aggregate level. 
However, our research is more specific in seeking to understand the significance of I.R.P.M. 
abolition within a sector and by giving attention to the firm, product and brand levels. In the 
most detailed post war treatment of Cadbury, the abolition of I.R.P.M. is cited as the ‘major 
change’ shaping ‘the pattern of distribution for confectionery manufacturers’, yet there has 
been little research that explores Cadbury’s marketing practices before and after abolition.24 
As becomes clear below, in relation to the case of Cadbury, the changes introduced by 
I.R.P.M. abolition were not without contest and challenge. 
3.0 Methodology 
It has been argued that ‘British marketing was highly distinctive and firmly embedded in the 
institutions that grew up around industries’, which suggests that sector and firm level case 
studies are particularly useful methods of advancing knowledge in this area.25 Cadbury acted 
as a powerful advocate of confectionery manufacturers in public discourse with retailers. 
Concentrating attention on Cadbury provides a focal point in exploring a trade in which a 
wide variety of retailers and manufacturers entered into dialogue. In addition to being the 
largest confectionery manufacturer in the UK, Cadbury also manufactured grocery products, 
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which provides the opportunity to explore different types of engagement with retailers for 
different product types.  
This paper draws on two main sources. The first source is a recent addition to the catalogue 
of the Cadbury Archive, consisting of 31 large boxes, each containing up to 20 separate files 
of material. 26 The contents include a variety of sales and marketing correspondence related to 
the Restricted Trade Practices Act 1956 and Resale Prices Act 1964.27 The material relates to 
internal communications and personal correspondence: between Cadbury directors and 
managers; between Cadbury and other confectionery manufacturers; and Cadbury 
correspondence with retailers and retail trade associations. It is important to note that the 
minutes of Cadbury board meetings, which have informed previous research on Cadbury, 
only record the board’s decisions and provide no record of the discussions that took place.28 
Therefore, the first set of sources used in this paper, containing evidence of board room 
deliberations and associated correspondence, add considerably to our knowledge of the 
decision making that shaped Cadbury’s post war marketing and distribution.  
The archives reveal that senior managers and directors at Cadbury had access to bilateral 
correspondences between rival manufacturers and retailers, presumably as a result of 
historical co-operation between chocolate and confectionery manufacturers and the impetus 
to share knowledge in their attempt to challenge proposed changes to R.P.M.. These materials 
are significant as we have not as yet been able to identify retailer archives that provide 
detailed evidence on the issues considered by this research; in the case of Tesco, the retailer 
most frequently mentioned in this paper, no archive exists. 
The Cadbury sources provide the most detailed insight from 1953-1967. The material in this 
period relates to Cadbury Brothers and excludes Fry. Cadbury Brothers Ltd. merged with J.S. 
Fry & Sons Ltd in 1919 to form the British Cocoa and Chocolate Company, but the two firms 
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retained operational independence until the formation of the Cadbury Group in February 
1967.29  
For the period 1968-1975, the Cadbury sources contain fewer records, with some 
correspondence with the main Cadbury Board, consultancy reports and marketing policy 
documents. This was a period of significant change at Cadbury, following the merger with 
Schweppes in 1969 and the creation of a multi-divisional structure.30 Consequently a second 
source The Grocer, a weekly publication with a strong readership across the retailing and 
food production spectrum, is used to supplement the Cadbury sources and to gain further 
insight into the relationships between Cadbury and supermarket retailers for this period.  
It is important to understand that the two sources utilised in this paper need to be interpreted 
in different ways. The Cadbury sources are interpreted with the understanding that managers 
in organisations are involved in language games through which organisational identity is 
constructed.31 The voice of the manager is positioned within the firm in relation to the 
organisational division he or she is located within and divisional goals, but also in relation to 
the corporate strategy of the firm as a whole. The voice of managers in The Grocer are best 
understood through theories of institutional work, which emphasise the role of managers in 
influencing institutional contexts.32 The Grocer provides a view of the external corporate 
image of Cadbury that its managers were seeking to project to retail buyers and other industry 
stakeholders. The content of the various sources used in this paper, therefore, must be read as 
constructions that are anchored in specific contexts. 
4.0 Cadbury 1953-1967: Challenge to retailing as manufacturer’s marketing strategy 
Under I.R.P.M. manufacturers enjoyed the freedom to enforce confectionery resale prices 
with the consequence that retailers were primarily regarded by Cadbury as vertically 
integrated agents of distribution in this regard.33 Retailers were also often dependent upon 
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manufacturer merchandising and advertising support. However, following the effective break 
down of I.R.P.M. on many grocery products during the 1950s, self-service retailers and 
supermarkets were achieving greater strategic importance, not least in matters of pricing. The 
unrealised potential of supermarket retailers in confectionery sales eventually led them to 
seek greater concessions from Cadbury and to seek the abolition of I.R.P.M. for these goods. 
In this section we provide empirical evidence that outlines Cadbury’s marketing strategy and 
the responses of different retailers which sought to wield more influence in the supply chain. 
4.1 Cadbury’s Marketing Strategy 
Following the end of rationing and the resumption of a competitive market for confectionery 
in 1953, Cadbury was characterised by a ‘production-cum-marketing’ orientation that had 
developed during the first half of the twentieth century.34 Efficiencies achieved through 
economies of scale and mechanisation were used by Cadbury in a bid to outcompete rival 
manufacturers and create consumer loyalty to the Cadbury brand. Cadbury employed specific 
push and pull marketing strategies to drive sales. Cadbury’s push strategies involved control 
over distribution, to be achieved by tight control over distributors’ margins and direct supply 
to retailers by a team of salesmen who increasingly relied more upon the ‘“saleability” of a 
line than the salesman’s persuasion’.35 In confectionery, Cadbury adjusted distributors’ 
margins in proportion to the volume of sales. For example in 1962, 6d. milk block margins 
varied between 17.2% and 23.5%.36 This margin included a 1¼% discount for cash payments 
within one month. Since the 1930s Cadbury had also provided additional discounts to 
selected multiple retailers, wholesalers, cinemas and theatres, either because of their size or 
their monopoly position.37 These ‘special discounts’ were revised in January 1957, reflecting 
the turnover of the distributor. Furthermore, in 1963 a performance bonus was introduced that 
was applied to year-on-year increases in turnover.38 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
recipients of these discounts included some grocery multiples like International Tea 
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Company’s Stores, Sainsbury’s and Express Dairies (Premier Supermarkets) whose store 
estates were increasingly being converted to self-service and supermarket formats. Other 
recipients included the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) and Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale Society (SCWS) which Cadbury recorded as multiple retailers. However, few 
grocery multiples were recipients of the highest levels of special discount offered by 
Cadbury.39 This provides further support for the claim that Cadbury were the ‘worst-placed’ 
of the main manufacturers to benefit from the rise of self-service grocers, by virtue of the fact 
that it had nurtured CTNs as its main distribution outlet.40 
The pull side of the marketing equation was achieved through mass advertising on a limited 
range of products, and a strong corporate house brand. Cadbury began working with 
advertising agencies to produce television commercials; being one of the first brands to 
appear in 1955. A revised marketing approach emerged that focused on promoting new 
products that were launched with in store displays, posters, money off coupons, press and 
television advertising; the first example of this new strategy being the launch of a grocery 
item, ‘Half Covered Biscuits’, in 1957.41 During the early 1960s, 20 individually branded 
products out of 60 were the focus of major advertising campaigns by Cadbury, compared to 
only four heavily advertised products in the inter-war period.42 Cadbury responded to 
competitors by increasing its total spending on advertising chocolate from £1,581,000 in 
1960, to £2,018,000 in 1961; part of an effort to compete with the launch of Galaxy by rival 
Mars in the autumn of 1960.43 National chocolate consumption remained static, however, 
whilst advertising revenues continued to increase to a trade total of £11.1 million in 1962, of 
which Cadbury accounted for £3,521,000.44 
Cadbury defended I.R.P.M. on its confectionery lines during this period, but the situation it 
faced in the grocery goods trade was more complicated, including greater pressure for price 
cutting from some retailers. Cadbury archival sources reveal that following the 1956 abolition 
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of C.R.P.M. on grocery products, the firm was monitoring the effect of price cutting on 
grocery sales and the disposition of independent retailers towards this. For example, Cadbury 
kept detailed records of sales of rival Nestlé’s coffee brand, Nescafé, which increased as a 
result of retailer price cutting. Cadbury noted that Nestlé had frustrated independent grocers 
due to their margins policy, which meant that large multiples retailers were able to sell to 
consumers below the price that independents could buy Nescafé through wholesalers.45 An 
internal Cadbury memorandum from the Marketing Group of the Bournville Sales Committee 
stated that: ‘Our own approach to the question of price maintenance has never been 
doctrinaire, and our policy would continue to be determined empirically as in the past.’46 
Manufacturing both confectionery and grocery lines, Cadbury was aware that I.R.P.M. could 
protect distribution through independent grocers and CTNs, but equally it could hinder sales 
through multiple retailers that were rapidly adopting self-service and supermarket formats. 
4.2. Cadbury relations with supermarket retailers 
The paper now turns to examine the tactics adopted by supermarket retailers in the lead up to 
confectionery I.R.P.M. abolition. It reveals the growing power of supermarket operators that 
were seeking to have their marketing strategies recognised and supported by manufacturers. 
To this end a variety of tactics were employed by the retailers, which were met with a robust 
response from Cadbury. For example, an internal Cadbury memorandum on the grocery trade 
from 1964 described a market inhabited by ‘deal conscious and concession spoilt 
operators’.47 The same memorandum provided examples of the promotional allowances 
requested by retailers, including those operating supermarkets, such as Elmo, Anthony 
Jackson, Victor Value and Tesco. Cadbury noted that wherever retailers were introducing 
price-cutting on grocery lines assurances had been made with regard to strict adherence to 
Cadbury’s price policy on chocolate and confectionery lines. The seeking of such assurances 
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must be seen in a context in which certain retailers were providing shoppers with trading 
stamps on confectionery goods, thus effectively circumventing I.R.P.M..48 
In December 1963, Cadbury withheld supplies from Tesco in response to the issue of trading 
stamps on its goods.49 Although Cadbury did not withdraw its products from all retailers 
issuing stamps, it wasn’t prepared to supply those that issued stamps on confectionery 
purchases.50 With the subsequent passing of the 1964 Resale Price Act, and with arguments 
for maintaining I.R.P.M. seeming to appear increasingly unattractive in public debate,51 
supermarket retailers continued to try to influence public opinion before the Restrictive 
Practices Court hearing. The initial issuing of stamps was followed up by reductions on the 
ticket price of Cadbury confectionery by a number of supermarket chains. For example, in 
March 1965 Tesco cut prices on Cadbury lines.52 Cadbury responded by withholding supplies 
from price cutting multiples and all their subsidiaries, stating that they believed that price-
cutting would result in short term gains for the consumer, but higher prices in the long term.53 
Tesco was committed to exposing consumers to lower confectionery prices. In addition to 
issuing stamps and direct price cuts, Tesco imported confectionery from mainland Europe 
where labour costs were lower, with a typical 1-lb. assortment box of such chocolates 
retailing at 4s 6d. comparing favourably to Cadbury’s ‘Milk Tray Pictorial’ at 8s 9d. 1-lb.54 
Furthermore, Tesco used the goodwill it had built up with less powerful manufacturers to win 
concessions, which also had the effect of disrupting the historical co-operation between 
manufacturers. Tesco’s initial success in this respect was with Mackintosh. 
An intra-departmental memorandum from the confectionery manufacturer Mackintosh is 
found in the Cadbury archive. It is likely that it was shared by Mackintosh as part of 
Cadbury’s gathering of intelligence from confectionery firms in the lead up to the I.R.P.M. 
court hearing in 1967. The memorandum records the details of a visit by Mr. Henderson 
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(Mackintosh) to Mr. Jack Cohen (Tesco). It reveals that Mackintosh had been investing in 
merchandising and display at Tesco in exchange for guaranteed product placement.55 This 
approach was to see Mackintosh become the brand leader in confectionery at Tesco. Shortly 
thereafter Tesco commenced stamp trading, which placed Mackintosh in a dilemma about 
whether to continue supplying Tesco. The memorandum records the claim by Cohen that 
both Cadbury and Rowntree had made several representations to Tesco about the ‘extent of 
the display given to Mackintosh merchandise in their stores’.56 It also records that Cohen 
revealed that he would not exclude confectionery from stamp trading on principle and that if 
Mackintosh stopped supplying him in solidarity with other suppliers, ‘he was prepared to 
bring a Court case’ against the firm.57 However, Cohen then explained that he would rather 
bring a case against Cadbury. A subsequent letter from Mackintosh to confectionery 
manufacturer and retailer Maynards revealed that although Mackintosh had persuaded one 
supermarket retailer to sell their merchandise without stamps they believed that in future this 
could be difficult to maintain: 
We have made a big investment in supermarkets and in view of the 
Government’s announcement on R.P.M. which has thrown Stamps and Price 
Cutting into the melting pot, we have got to maintain a balance between the 
situation as it is at the moment and a vastly different trading situation say in 
April [1964]. I shall try as hard as I can as a salesman to avoid a situation 
whereby we have to stop supplying any customer big or small. Is this a cynical 
attitude? If there is a blatant case of giving stamps with our goods then of 
course we will take the matter up with the company concerned…58 
This archive material reveals the increasing complexity of manufacturer-retailer relations in 
the advance of the I.R.P.M. court hearing and the growing pressure that was being exerted by 
more powerful retailers upon manufacturers. 
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During this period Cadbury was keen to learn more about the effects of promotional 
discounts on confectionery sales in supermarkets. In 1966, the firm conducted in-store 
experiments with self-service and supermarket retailers on its premier brand Cadbury Dairy 
Milk, including Tesco, Fine Fare, Lipton and Victor Value.59 Cadbury drew the conclusion 
that: 
the figures show what considerable increases in sales can be made in 
supermarkets when off-shelf promotions are given to individual lines. They 
add credibility to our general view therefore that with price-cutting, 
supermarkets will be able to achieve substantial increases across the board in 
leading lines.60 
The archival evidence also indicates that Cadbury began to take notice of merchandising in 
supermarkets more widely during the 1960s. The firm’s Advertising Department’s Annual 
Report 1963 explained: 
We have also aimed at improving positions in supermarkets. There has been a 
determined effort to secure permanent confectionery positions on the main 
gondolas and in addition three types of checkout stands have been available. In 
both the counter conversion scheme and the supermarkets, we have operated 
jointly with Fry’s to secure the maximum display front for the joint firms.61 
In 1965, Cadbury dispatched 600 ‘Check out W Stands’, designed to display 22 Cadbury 
lines.62 At the same time the firm was experimenting with a supermarket gondola display 
with ‘one or two Supermarket Chains’, which would display Cadbury brands at eye level 
and carry the following lines: 20 Cadbury, 9 Mars, 8 Rowntree, 6 Mackintosh, 5 Fry, 3 other 
and 8 sugar lines.63 In 1966, end of aisle dump bins were being trialled with Tesco and 
16 
 
Victor Value. Cadbury reported sales two to three times higher in the first quarter and three 
to six times higher in the fourth quarter.64 
4.3 Cadbury and the abolition of I.R.P.M. in confectionery  
The key event that closes our first time period was the Restrictive Practices Court hearing 
relating to confectionery goods on 25 July 1967.65 In reviewing the archive materials related 
to the I.R.P.M. case prepared by Cadbury, we learn much about the importance of different 
types of retailers as constituents of Cadbury’s marketing strategy. I.R.P.M. enabled Cadbury 
to fix the retail price of its confectionery products and to protect CTNs from competition 
from self-service grocers. Protecting high-service dealers was considered to be important by 
Cadbury, because the firm considered confectionery to be an impulse purchase that required 
widespread distribution. The archives reveal that some economists who were proponents of 
I.R.P.M. lent their support to Cadbury.66 
As the largest confectionery manufacturer in the UK, Cadbury was placed in a difficult 
position when it chose to defend I.R.P.M. in the Restrictive Practices Court. Cadbury’s 
corporate reputation was based around the public narrative of fair play enshrined in 
‘Cadburyism’,67 a corporate identity rooted in the Quakerism of the firm’s founders. In the 
I.R.P.M. case ‘Cadburyism’ was tested across three main stakeholder groups i.e. retailers, the 
consuming public and other manufacturers. 
First, and foremost with regard to the focus of this paper, Cadbury had to account for the 
views of its retail stakeholders, which varied from the small CTNs, many turning less than 
£200 of Cadbury products annually, to grocery and confectionery retailers operating large 
chains of stores and doing trade measured in some cases in excess of £100,000. In two cases, 
Woolworths and the CWS, accounts exceeded one million pounds.68 The I.R.P.M. case thus 
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shone a powerful light on the conundrum faced by manufacturers like Cadbury whose 
products were distributed by large-scale and small-scale retailers alike.69  
Woolworths was Cadbury’s largest individual retail customer, and since 1947 was the only 
account to receive the highest special discount of 4% on the basis of it being the only 
individual retailer account worth over £1 million.70 Its significance to Cadbury is highlighted 
in correspondence between the firms about I.R.P.M. and in subsequent memoranda about the 
Restrictive Practices Court hearing. In a discussion with the Managing Director of 
Woolworths, the Cadbury Director of Marketing, R.N. Wadsworth revealed that Cadbury was 
not ‘doctrinaire’ about price maintenance and that without Woolworths’ co-operation in 
retaining prices it would be unable to justify maintaining its policy in light of pre-emptive 
cutting from supermarket chains.71 Subsequently, archive papers reveal that Cadbury 
perceived that the non-attendance of Woolworths at court would be damaging to their case, 
but finding Woolworths unwilling to attend Cadbury chose not to seek a subpoena and risk 
damaging the trading relationship.72 
At the other end of the retail spectrum were a myriad of small CTNs. In its submission to the 
Restrictive Practices Court, Cadbury predicted that without I.R.P.M. self-service stores and 
supermarkets would disrupt current patterns of distribution and change consumer behaviour 
to the detriment of the specialist retail trade. Based on its calculations of changes to 
confectionery and tobacco trading (also affected by I.R.P.M.) post I.R.P.M. Cadbury 
predicted a 50% reduction in large sweet shops, a 40% reduction in medium-sized sweet 
shops and a 30% reduction in small sweet shops.73 The Court’s opinion was that a 1% rise in 
confectionery margins would prevent a reduction in the number of retail outlets, but Cadbury 
argued that this would be insufficient.  
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Newspapers positioned Cadbury as championing the cause of CTNs.74 However, Cadbury’s 
position towards the small independent confectionery retailer was more ambiguous than was 
reported in public. Cadbury was aware of the low value of the smallest CTNs to its bottom 
line.75 In 1963, very small independents with less than £200 of annual trade with Cadbury 
represented 56.1% of Cadbury accounts, but only 14.1% of sales.76 Essentially, many CTNs 
represented high cost and low value distributors to Cadbury. This helps to inform our 
understanding of the sometimes rather terse relationship between Cadbury and the National 
Union of Retail Confectioners (N.U.R.C.), which represented many small retailers and sought 
more generous margins for its members. In an internal discussion in 1961, Cadbury used 
Board of Trade data and its own confectionery shop panel data to support the opinion that 
‘there is no reason why someone should earn a living out of retailing confectionery’ and that 
the confectionery firms ‘cannot compensate retailers for loss of market share’.77 Cadbury 
understood that its stance ‘means fewer selling points handling a range of lines, and 
inevitably some subordination of the confectionery interests’.78 When considering raising 
margins to N.U.R.C. members, Cadbury reasoned that ‘it would be wrong to reduce the value 
to the consumer by giving more to the trade.’79 
Second, Cadbury was keenly aware of the perceptions of consumers. The firm considered 
itself committed to delivering value to consumers as a core part of its strategy. Newspaper 
reports reveal that this commitment was viewed as disingenuous by supermarket retailers, 
who were unable to cut confectionery prices under I.R.P.M. legislation. In 1967, seven 
months before the Restricted Practices Court heard the manufacturers’ case, Jack Cohen 
(Tesco) was reported to ‘forecast that chocolates, at present rigidly price-controlled, would be 
the next bastion to collapse’.80 Company documents reveal that Cadbury was concerned 
about the public’s perception of the firm’s stance surrounding I.R.P.M. in confectionery. A 
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market research report from 1964 based upon a survey of 1,088 members of the public 
concluded: 
‘as far as the public is concerned it is quite clear that the policy which is most 
acceptable is one that supports the abolition of r.p.m., because it brings lower prices, 
whilst expressing concern at the effect on small shopkeepers’.81 
Third, Cadbury also had to gain support from rival manufacturers in order to fight the 
I.R.P.M. case, but not all manufacturers were convinced that I.R.P.M. was in their best 
interests. Fitzgerald notes that under I.R.P.M., ‘competition to an important extent was 
dependent upon marketing, product development, advertising and branding rather than price’ 
and it is clear that large scale confectionery manufacturers had already achieved an oligopoly 
status that would enable them to sustain high profit margins in a post-I.R.P.M. environment.82 
The case of Mars is illustrative of the challenges that Cadbury faced in this regard. Mars is 
reported to have written to its retail customers in March 1965 to the effect that it was going to 
maintain the price of its goods and that it would withhold supplies from price cutters.83 When 
Mars subsequently communicated their intention to stay out of the I.R.P.M. court case, 
Cadbury Marketing Director, R.N. Wadsworth, wrote to Mars to express a concern that the 
court might infer from its non-appearance as a witness that Mars wished to see the end of 
I.R.P.M.84 Cadbury was subsequently unable to persuade Mars to defend I.R.P.M., which 
suggests that Mars may have perceived the advantages of a more liberalised market for its 
business model focussed upon a small number of heavily advertised countlines.  
Lacking support from major confectionery manufacturers Mars and Nestlé, and its largest 
retail account, Woolworths, Cadbury nevertheless decided to fight the I.R.P.M. case.85 
Paradoxically, the firm could see certain disadvantages in I.R.P.M. and some senior managers 
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were equivocal as to the merits of its continuation. R.N. Wadsworth, described the situation 
thus:  
It is quite possible that although the total industry output may be reduced, the 
Five leading firms could benefit from the ending of R.P.M. with a larger 
share of a smaller market. If we believe this, then we find ourselves fighting 
a case which is not in our own interest.86 
Cadbury subsequently lost the case and faced a new market environment in which 
supermarket retailers were to become more significant. 
5.0 Cadbury 1968-1975: Collaboration in retailer-manufacturer marketing strategy 
The business history literature emphasises an increasing drive for profitability as a key focus 
of Cadbury planning in this period.87 Attempts to increase profitability since 1957 had 
resulted in limited success in Cadbury’s UK operations, with static demand for confectionery 
a notable barrier. In this context, Cadbury’s merger with Schweppes in 1969 is highlighted as 
an event that signalled a shift from a more patient long-term orientation towards profitability 
towards a more short term one.88 More widely, the Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes notes 
the significance of changes in retailing as a driver of such activity in this period: 
The increasing concentration in the retail trade with the development of supermarkets 
and the abolition of resale price maintenance had a considerable influence on 
concentration among manufacturers. The balance of power was changing in favour of 
the large retailer, which led to further concentration both in distribution and among 
manufacturers in their attempt to restore the equilibrium as they saw it.89 
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The merger accelerated the strategy of diversification that had begun in 1962 with the initial 
move into packaged cakes. By 1965, Cadbury had begun to frame itself ‘as a food 
company’90 and in February 1967 the company (i.e. Cadbury Brothers, J.S. Fry & Sons, and 
Pascall-Murray) was renamed the ‘Cadbury Group’ to reflect the widened product areas it 
was now dealing in. With the formation of the Cadbury Group, the company had been 
reorganised into three divisions: UK Confectionery; UK Foods; Overseas. The Confectionery 
and Foods divisions had their own separate sales forces, and the confectionery division was 
further subdivided into a sales force for Cadbury confectionery and another for Fry-Pascall 
products. Likewise the Foods division had its own sales force for selling drinks, biscuits and 
other grocery lines, with a separate division for Cadbury Cakes.91 The Foods division 
accounted for 21 per cent of Cadbury’s UK turnover in 1967. Following the merger with 
Schweppes in 1969, Cadbury adopted a multi-divisional structure with ‘separate ‘groups’ for 
confectionery, drinks, foods, tea and coffee, and overseas’.92 
In the following sections, the paper explores attempts by supermarket retailers to 
fundamentally influence Cadbury’s marketing strategy in two key areas of marketing 
practice. It examines Cadbury’s innovative responses as it sought to reconcile its position in 
an I.R.P.M. free market situation in confectionery as well as grocery goods. 
Advertising and promotions  
In 1966, Cadbury had predicted that post-I.R.P.M. they would need to ‘force the hands’ of 
distributors by increasing advertising spend in order to stimulate consumer demand for 
confectionery. The firm also foresaw the need to make special payments for display with 
large grocery distributors in return for point of sale support.93 For example, Marketing 
Director R.N. Wadsworth forecast the situation that would develop soon after the abolition of 
I.R.P.M., 
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…it is important to understand what will be the relationship between the 
manufacturer and the supermarket and other large retailers. The manufacturer 
will be concerned to obtain permanent positions for as many of his lines as 
possible on the supermarket fixtures. He will also be concerned to obtain as 
often as possible ‘off shelf’ features when sales can, for short bursts, exceed 
the normal rate of sale by several hundred per cent. To obtain these ‘off shelf’ 
promotions the manufacturer will have to negotiate with the trader and to offer 
special terms which will enable the trader to cut the price of the product and 
thereby secure sufficiently increased sales to increase his profits.94 
In 1967, some 3.5% of all chocolate and sugar confectionery sales were through 2,625 
supermarkets, with a further 5.5% of sales accounted for by other types of self-service 
grocery store.95 Cadbury estimated that there were over 10,000 count lines in the UK 
confectionery market and that following I.R.P.M. abolition the major growth in distribution 
would come through supermarket outlets, which on average stocked no more than 100 lines.96 
In a planning document of 1968, Cadbury identified that: ‘The confectioner needs variety, 
while the grocer requires volume lines which are attractively packed, heavily advertised and 
which sell themselves’.97 
In the aftermath of I.R.P.M. abolition, The Times newspaper wrote of ‘open war’ between the 
larger manufacturers in the confectionery trade as they increased their marketing campaigns 
in the major supermarkets, with ‘money-off’ price promotions, new multi-packs and larger 
assortments.98 The potential of the retail grocery trade was clear, with more than double the 
number of outlets but accounting for only half the turnover of confectioners.99 
The increased potential for supermarket retailers to join confectionery multiples in 
demanding enhanced promotional terms aggravated existing grievances of some independent 
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retailers in the trade. For example, in mid-July 1967, with I.R.P.M. about to be abolished, 1s 
bars of chocolate with a 2d money-off promotion were reported to have been distributed to 
the supermarkets and confectionery multiples, but not to independent retailers, much to the 
latter’s dismay. Cadbury explained it as a ‘coincidence’, but independent retailers and their 
representatives complained that they were again being disadvantaged.100  
The development of advertising and promotional strategies in a period of considerably 
changed manufacturer-retailer relations was a matter of debate in Cadbury’s confectionery 
and foods divisions alike. Post-I.R.P.M. Cadbury was seeking to effectively promote their 
goods through multiple grocers in order to drive sales, whilst preserving the share of their 
marketing budget that was spent above the line (i.e. on advertising Cadbury brands) to 
nurture consumer brand loyalty. Meanwhile, multiple retailers strove to become the main 
beneficiary of Cadbury’s marketing budgets and to divert more of these funds below the line 
(i.e. manufacturer payments to retailers) to strengthen their relationship with the consumer 
through tailored promotions and to compete with rival retailer brands.101  
The subject of manufacturer marketing budgets was addressed in 1970 by delegates attending 
the Advertising Association Conference held in Brighton.102 R.N. Wadsworth, now Managing 
Director of Cadbury Schweppes Foods, was the final speaker. He cited data suggesting above 
the line / below the line ratios for the following trades: Chemists 82/18; Confectionery 78/22; 
Grocery 55/45.103 Given that Cadbury had identified that the majority of its future 
confectionery products would be sold through grocery multiples,104 the data suggested that 
above the line expenditure on confectionery might be at risk.  
Wadsworth defended above the line expenditure, invoking the experience of building 
consumer support for the Marvel brand.105 He reasoned that below the line promotions would 
not help consumers to change their preferences about a product. Accepting that historical 
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terms of trade (i.e. margins) were irreversible and should be regarded as a concession, 
Wadsworth argued that further expansion of below the line expenditure should only be on the 
basis of pay by performance. Wadsworth concluded by stating that greater levels of 
cooperation were envisaged in the future, because the relationship between the manufacturer 
and retailer was no longer between a buyer and seller, but ‘between a manufacturer and the 
owner of an advertising medium’.106 
The enhanced power of the supermarket retailers drew manufacturers into collaboration on 
promotions. In April 1968, Cadbury announced that it was no longer going to recommend 
retail prices for grocery products, thereby giving retailers more control over pricing and more 
freedom to discount goods.107 One month later the firm launched a new marketing strategy 
with Tesco, offering Green Shield Stamps on packs of Mini-Rolls in a two week promotion. 
Cadbury defended its decision in The Grocer magazine thus: 
Allowances are being made and these are in line with modern marketing 
methods where certain sums are made available for promotions with major 
customers with high turnover – the method of spending these sums being 
determined by the customer.108 
This use of stamps was reported to be the first of its kind by a British manufacturer and 
invoked criticisms from non-stamp competitor Sainsbury’s, whose position gained support 
from adopters of rival stamp schemes, Allied and Fine Fare.109 Non-stamp retailers, in 
particular, saw the Cadbury deal as offering a below the line reduction to Tesco that could not 
be replicated. They also protested that Cadbury might start printing stamp offers on all its 
packs, which would discriminate against non-stamp trading competitors on a more permanent 
basis.110 
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Distribution and merchandising  
Renewed negotiations over advertising and promotional strategies were accompanied by 
changes in retailers’ distribution practices. These latter practices caused Cadbury to seek 
innovative forms of merchandising partnership with retailers in order to retain influence at 
the point of sale. 
In the 1960s, the sales representatives at Cadbury had multiple roles. They were responsible 
for taking orders, promoting product lines, product display, pricing, merchandising and 
stocking shelves.111 In 1966, Cadbury delivered confectionery goods directly to branch stores 
or wholesalers with the exception of Sainsbury’s and Maynards, which it supplied through 
retailer depots.112 The pattern of distribution between manufacturers and the large-scale 
grocery multiples began to change over the ensuing decade, as the multiples explored options 
to further centralise the buying and distribution functions rather than continue to rely on 
direct to store deliveries.113 Such changes could negatively impact upon the roles of the sales 
representatives who represented a vital link in the supply chain for manufacturers. 
The pages of The Grocer reveal the contrasting opinions of some manufacturers and retailers 
over the roles and effectiveness of the manufacturers’ sales representatives. For example, In 
1970, David Brown (Market Research Director, Cadbury Schweppes) argued that without 
manufacturer display, merchandising and promotion, food stores will become ‘terribly dull’ 
with stores having a ‘clinical hospital appearance and image.’114 In the same year, John 
Harvey (Sales and Marketing Director, Grocery Foods Division, Cadbury Schweppes Foods), 
despite acknowledging some limitations regarding the adequate training of sales 
representatives, defended their autonomy to ‘write showcards as well as merchandise’, also 
noting that ‘Cadbury spend a lot of time helping reps to do effective pricing’.115 
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Some supermarket retailers expressed rather different views about the value of 
manufacturers’ sales representatives. For example The Grocer reported on a Marketing Clinic 
held in January 1970, in which John Harvey (Cadbury Schweppes Foods) chaired a meeting 
of consultants and managers including Cyril Peggs (Grocery Merchandising Manager, 
Safeway Foodstores). Peggs argued: 
It costs £3,000 a year to keep a merchandiser on the road. Multiply £3,000 by 
the number of merchandisers a manufacturer has and the result is a terrific on-
cost. We, the manufacturer’s customers have to pay this money – it’s added to 
their selling cost. But the service we get from manufacturer’s merchandisers 
isn’t a patch on our own staff.116 
The view was not restricted to the management of supermarket retailers only. For 
example David Frewin, manager of an independent store, argued that manufacturers’ 
representatives were not communicating effectively with each other and with their 
own central management. The implication was that manufacturers would be better 
served by outsourcing many of the sales representatives’ functions to the retailer.117 
Store managers also expressed dissatisfaction with the situation. For example, one 
Tesco store manager commented that he had enquiries from 200 merchandisers every 
week at his store, which made it impossible to coordinate in-store marketing given 
the impossibility of remembering the different promotions and schemes being run by 
rival manufacturers.118 He also argued that manufacturers’ display material: 
…clashes with the product sheets, guards, advertising material which our 
company has issued us for particular promotions…The average card left 
behind or stuck on the shelf by a salesman is so diabolical, that as soon as he 
has turned his back I take the thing off.119  
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Cadbury sought to pre-empt the concerns of retailers, arguing that supermarket retailers 
would need to be educated about modern merchandising methods, devoting 16 merchandisers 
to work exclusively with supermarket outlets.120 
As the role of sales representatives was scrutinised by retailers, manufacturers like 
Cadbury were faced with the threat of diminishing opportunities to directly control 
the display of their products in store. Manufacturers now turned to other more 
indirect means in an attempt to influence the merchandising of important categories. 
Outlining their strategy for confectionery post I.R.P.M., Cadbury stated that: 
Multiple and self-service store operators will be asked to establish permanent 
confectionery sections, or permit existing sections to be redesigned, following 
prepared merchandising principles. Sales for a given period will be carefully 
measured and related to sales over the same length of time before the section 
was redesigned.121  
Cadbury trialled this new approach with Bishops Stores Ltd., the London based self-service 
and supermarket retailer.122 
The case of Smash instant mashed potato (hereafter IMP) provides an important example 
from the grocery trade of attempts to use more indirect means to influence merchandising. 
Launched by Cadbury in 1968, by 1970 Smash held approximately 60 per cent of the IMP 
market. By 1971, IMP was a £10 million market with 35 brands, many of which were 
private labels (i.e. own brands) and Cadbury was spending approximately £500,000 per 
annum advertising Smash, representing 40% of the trade advertising expenditure on IMP.123 
In 1970, John Harvey (Sales and Marketing Director, Grocery Foods Division, Cadbury 
Schweppes Foods) argued that Cadbury was not receiving representation on supermarket 
shelves in proportion to the volume of sales of Smash.124 Seeking to rectify this Cadbury 
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took the lead in developing a pay-for-space shelving unit through which it sought to 
influence display of the category in supermarkets.125 Each IMP supplier would pay a direct 
contribution to the display manufacturer, Kenton Displays of Birmingham, for the use of the 
display, with the amount of space dedicated to each brand determined through the 
calculation of the brand’s store performance and overall sales in a multiple retailer. Any 
manufacturer that refused to pay would be excluded from the unit although not necessarily 
from the stores themselves. Cadbury distributed 800 of these units, principally to Tesco 
(250) and Fine Fare (320).126 Lacking I.R.P.M. support, Cadbury now searched for 
innovative solutions to retain control within the manufacturer-retailer relationship. 
6.0 Conclusion 
This paper argues that the rise of self-service and supermarket retailers had an impact on 
Cadbury’s marketing strategy, requiring the manufacturer to evaluate the changing role of 
retailers in the distribution of its goods, and to innovate in response to the changes occurring. 
The analysis of previously neglected company archival data provides evidence of Cadbury’s 
early experimentation in confectionery merchandising in supermarkets. Moreover, we focus 
attention on Cadbury’s responses to the increasing promotional demands that some retailers 
operating chains of supermarkets sought to exert upon the manufacturer in the period leading 
up to the abolition of confectionery I.R.P.M. in 1967. The significance and the influence of 
the supermarket retailers grew as the debates over the case for abolition intensified. 
Thereafter, Cadbury sought to establish strategic marketing partnerships with key retailers 
that would allow it to retain some control over retailers’ distribution and merchandising of its 
confectionery goods, albeit increasingly by more indirect means. This approach was mirrored 
in relation to grocery goods, a trade into which Cadbury progressively diversified as growth 
opportunities in the confectionery market lessened. In sum, as supermarket retailers 
strengthened their position within Cadbury’s supply chains asserting themselves as strategic 
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partners in decision-making across many aspects of distribution, so Cadbury was forced to 
respond in order to bolster its position. 
Whilst the abolition of I.R.P.M. clearly marked a watershed moment in Cadbury’s 
relationship with the retailers that distributed its confectionery products, it is too simplistic to 
claim that abolition of I.R.P.M. was the only influential factor when seeking to understand 
the changing relationship between confectionery manufacturers and retailers and the resulting 
impact on marketing practices in the period. Nevertheless, the abolition of I.R.P.M. did 
enhance the strategic power and position of large-scale grocery retailers, which were 
increasingly operating supermarket outlets, towards manufacturers like Cadbury. The 
consequence of this was that Cadbury had to further revise its marketing strategy and develop 
innovative practices in order to exert influence at the retail end of the supply chain. As such, 
Cadbury, like other manufacturers, was seeking to respond to and, where it felt it appropriate, 
to contest challenges posed by the increasing power exercised by some retailers. 
Building upon the evidence of Cadbury’s earlier historical development, the paper contributes 
new knowledge of Cadbury’s movement along the spectrum from a more heavily production 
oriented approach to more of a marketing orientation; from a position in which it could 
dictate terms to retailers through the control of margins, inventory and distribution, to one in 
which it was necessary to pioneer new forms of promotion and merchandising in an attempt 
to maintain its historical advantage. The paper, therefore, contributes to the business history 
literature on the evolution of manufacturer-retailer relationships and attempts to account for 
the role of market regulation in shaping the characteristics of firm’s strategies. 
The paper also contributes to recent calls to enhance the attention given to the wider food 
system and its production-consumption chains when interpreting the rise of the 
supermarket.127 In particular, by comparing and contrasting the marketing activities of 
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Cadbury under the differing conditions of the post war confectionery and grocery goods 
markets, we reveal the complexity of one firm’s interactions with an increasingly powerful 
retail sector. Like in other areas of the food industry, as shown, for example, by Godley and 
William’s study of the poultry sector, the activities of retailers operating growing chains of 
self-service stores and supermarkets were influential.128 However, the findings of this paper 
show that the consequences for manufacturers’ marketing strategies of rising retailer power 
played out in markedly differing ways across the food market. 
More specifically, in exploring the link between marketing and structural change the paper 
confirms the importance of adopting a contextualised approach when researching the 
confectionery trade in different national contexts.129 Researching the UK confectionery 
industry emphasises the importance of contextualising marketing innovations within a 
network of relations including companies (other manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers), 
government, and consumers. 
A number of areas for further study can be identified. First, in the space of this paper it has 
not been possible to examine in any detail the evidence for any exchange of knowledge and 
practices between Cadbury divisions with regard to marketing. Previous research into the 
confectionery trade has demonstrated the importance of managerial structures and cultural 
imprinting to corporate decision making, which suggests this could be a fertile area for 
further research.130 Second, the literature identifying communities of practice as vectors of 
retail innovation suggest that manufacturers’ trade associations may have been significant in 
shaping manufacturers’ marketing innovations:131 for example, The Cocoa, Chocolate and 
Confectionery Alliance. Third, whilst it is well established that retail innovations like the 
supermarket can occur through the geographical transfer of knowledge across national 
contexts, it does not mean that the findings of this research can be generalised to other 
international contexts in a simple manner. As this research has taken pains to demonstrate, 
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the UK has a specific constellation of regulations and sectoral collaborations that have 
conditioned the development of marketing strategies by manufacturers with retailers. The 
paper, therefore, provides further evidence of the need to understand the processes by which 
retailers operating supermarket formats become embedded in the markets in which they trade.  
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